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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, two large movements have been making 
distinct contributions to the identity of the legal world. These 
movements, empirical legal studies1 and legal analytics, have done 
much to advance our study and understanding of the law, as well as 
our ability to predict future legal events of interest. It is true that 
these movements may have occasionally competing or contradictory 
goals (e.g., prediction versus explanation), but for the most part, it is 
their shared commonality that is driving both of them forward. This 
commonality is a strong emphasis on systematic and rigorous 
methods that emboldens scholars with a new confidence for 
answering their legal questions. While it may be near impossible in 
the present space to cover completely the points and nuances of each 
movement along with their differences and similarities, we think it is 
* Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of 
Kentucky.
** Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, University of 
Kentucky.
1. Theodore Eisenberg, The Origins, Nature, and Promise of Empirical 
Legal Studies and a Response to Concerns, 2011 U. ILL L. REV. 1713, 1713-14.
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beneficial to highlight one technique that is of interest and value to 
scholars of both movements. 
In this Article, we showcase a measurement approach that uses 
text as data to create a scale, or what is sometimes referred to as 
estimating a latent construct. What is different about our approach is 
that it is premised on using word dictionaries to define the two ends 
of the spectrum. We offer it as a simple yet powerful alternative. 
Ironically, while there are exceptions,2 dictionary-based approaches 
are not something that measurement scholars generally consider 
when trying to create scales.3 We apply our measurement technique 
to an important substantive question involving news media coverage 
of Supreme Court decisions, though we note at the outset that our 
technique could be applied more broadly. Specifically, we ask 
whether news content of the U.S. Supreme Court is ideologically 
slanted or biased. This is an important question because prior 
research has shown that ideological bias is prevalent in other areas of 
political news coverage,4 yet because the Court plays a special role in 
our government in terms of the rule of law, a biased news media 
covering Court decisions strikes at the foundational underpinnings of 
democracy. At the same time, we also argue there may be reasons 
why reporting on the Supreme Court may be different in this regard.
To answer our question, we use two different dictionaries—one 
based on “ideological” words and another based on “partisan” 
words—to examine the content of internet news stories from twenty-
six different outlets that covered decisions from the 2014 Supreme 
Court term. Next, we generate a series of plausible estimates based 
on different text processing decisions and then compare our 
estimates to externally valid measures of the ideology of news 
outlets.
Our contribution is important for several reasons. First, 
measuring latent constructs is a necessity for both empirical legal 
studies and legal analytics. Indeed, measurement is an important 
fundamental task for any empirical inquiry and is essentially the first 
step before any analysis can be undertaken. For example, before 
2. See generally Michael Laver & John Garry, Estimating Policy Positions 
from Political Texts, 44 AM. J. POL. SCI. 619 (2000). 
3. Justin Grimmer & Brandon M. Stewart, Text as Data: The Promise and 
Pitfalls of Automatic Content Analysis Methods for Political Texts, 21 POL.
ANALYSIS 267, 268-69 (2013).
4. Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse M. Shapiro & Daniel F. Stone, Media Bias in 
the Marketplace: Theory (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 
19880).
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answering whether and why legal expertise among judges has 
changed over time, one first has to be able to measure legal expertise 
in a way that is dynamic over time.5 Second, the technique we use 
here could be easily extended to measure any other latent construct 
of interest. The approach provides a very simple and easy-to-use 
framework, with its key being the identification of words that occupy 
both ends of the spectrum. It makes no assumptions about the 
ideological leanings of the documents in the text, avoiding one of the 
assumptions made by a classical supervised learning approach. Yet, 
importantly, because the dictionaries bring information to the process 
itself, it is not a completely unsupervised approach, where the 
researcher has no assurance that what one is measuring is in fact the 
dimension of interest. Ultimately, we are able to assess the validity 
of the approach with external measures of interest and are able to 
provide an answer to our question—whether news content of the 
Court is slanted or biased.
I. MEDIA COVERAGE OF JUDICIAL EVENTS
An underdeveloped subject area in empirical legal studies deals 
with the news media’s treatment of judicial activities and, more 
pertinent to our mission, the potential ideological biases that may 
seep into coverage of judicial institutions like the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Extant studies reveal Supreme Court news coverage to be 
largely inadequate6 and susceptible to conflict-centric biases in 
reporting.7 While coverage of the Court may be somewhat different 
than that of other governmental activities due to the relative 
inaccessibility of the institution and its output,8 the importance of 
understanding how the media covers judicial events is nonetheless 
vital to understanding public sentiment toward the Court. First, most 
Americans receive all of their information about the Supreme 
5. Anne Lippert & Justin Wedeking, Is Judicial Expertise Dynamic?
Judicial Expertise, Complex Networks, and Legal Policy, 2016 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 567, 573.
6. Chester A. Newland, Press Coverage of the United States Supreme 
Court, 17 WESTERN POL. Q. 15, 16 (1964).
7. MICHAEL A. ZILIS, THE LIMITS OF LEGITIMACY: DISSENTING OPINIONS,
MEDIA COVERAGE, AND PUBLIC RESPONSES TO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 25 (Univ. 
of Mich. Press, 2015); Tyler Johnson, How and Why the Supreme Court Remains 
Undercovered, in COVERING THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN THE DIGITAL 
AGE 23-24 (Richard Davis ed., 2014).
8. See generally RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE PRESS (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall 1994).
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Court’s activities from the media environment that not only chooses 
what events or decisions to spend resources covering, but how they 
opt to frame their content as well.9 As opposed to reading Supreme 
Court opinions directly, most rely on the media to interpret the 
decisions and supply enough adequate information for 
knowledgeable assessments of the institution and its actions. Thus, 
the media’s role in providing access to the activities of the Supreme 
Court is a tremendously important piece of the relationship between 
the Court and public support, both specific and diffuse. 
Second, the ways in which these media outlets opt to present 
their information, through potential subjectivity in coverage, bias, or 
slant, can have major impacts on public perceptions and,
subsequently, judicial behavior. For instance, Bartels and Johnston10
find that individuals who receive the majority of their news from 
“sensational” sources like cable news and talk radio are less 
supportive of the Supreme Court than those who prefer more 
traditional news sources like newspapers and network news 
programming. This theoretical difference between sensational and 
traditional news, according to the authors, is a matter of tone. And 
with the information provided by sensational sources likely to be 
more negative in tone, it thus influences consumers to be more 
critical of institutions like the Court. While Bartels and Johnston do 
not go so far as to validate the negativity of sensational media 
sources, others have used computer-assisted text analysis to find that 
negativity in tone varies systematically. For example, Denison, 
Wedeking, and Zilis find negative tone to be a function of the 
negativity of Court output, the degree of dissensus, and whether 
coalitions on the Court fall along ideological lines.11
Negativity is, however, only one latent construct through which 
we can observe differences in media coverage of the Supreme Court 
and is not necessarily an ideal proxy for critical or partial coverage. 
Perhaps of greater concern is the extent to which media coverage of 
9. As we discuss at the end of the Article, we only focus on content slant 
or bias in this Article, and we leave for future research how coverage slant or bias 
may also contribute to media bias.
10. Christopher D. Johnston & Brandon L. Bartels, Sensationalism and 
Sobriety: Differential Media Exposure and Attitudes Toward American Courts, 74
PUB. OPINION Q. 260, 261 (2010).
11. Alexander Denison, Justin Wedeking & Michael A. Zilis, Negative 
Media Coverage of the Supreme Court: The Interactive Role of Opinion Language, 
Coalition Size, and Ideological Signals (July 30, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2816431 [https://perma.cc/7P3W-3YUH].
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the institution is subject to ideological slant. Recent research from 
Ho and Quinn suggests that media coverage of the Supreme Court is 
indeed subject to systematic biases, most directly linked to the media 
outlet’s ideological affiliation.12 The authors utilize an item response 
theory (IRT) framework that places the presence and position of 
editorial content in several major newspapers against the votes of 
Supreme Court justices themselves, finding media outlets perceived 
to be liberal in content most closely aligned with liberal justices on 
the Court, and vice versa.13 For instance, The New York Times,
considered to be on the left of the ideological spectrum, was most 
closely aligned with the voting record of John Paul Stevens, a justice 
widely considered to be a liberal on the Court.14 Similarly, The Wall 
Street Journal, an outlet often associated with conservative content, 
was most closely aligned with the record of Justice Scalia, a 
longtime conservative stalwart.15 This provides one of the more 
robust analyses of media slant, not only in editorial coverage of the 
Supreme Court, but the broader media environment as well. 
While Ho and Quinn’s work is certainly a novel approach to 
measuring editorial bias, the assumptions underlying this finding, 
among similar findings in the literature regarding media coverage, 
raise questions about one of the key inferences that was drawn.16 Of 
paramount concern is the use of editorial content as opposed to that 
of “straight” news content in the analysis. The distinction between 
the two is important. Editorials are largely written to be persuasive in 
tone, and the ideological bias found within many editorials should 
come as no surprise to most. Indeed, readers expect editorials to have 
a particular slant on any given issue. A column from George Will in 
The Washington Post will often take the ideologically conservative 
position on an issue and advocate accordingly, just as an article from 
Eugene Robinson in the same paper will advocate for the liberal 
position under most circumstances. This content is essentially walled 
off from what is generally considered the “news” aspect of the outlet, 
usually put on a page of its own or in a separate and clearly distinct 
section. Alternatively, what is “straight” news—in our examples 
later, the general reporting on Supreme Court decisions—is arguably 
less likely to be so ideological in tone, at least if one believes in the 
12. See generally Daniel E. Ho & Kevin M. Quinn, Measuring Explicit 
Political Positions of Media, 3 Q.J. POL. SCI. 353 (2008).
13. See id. at 356.
14. See id. at 363-64, 370-71.
15. See id.
16. See id.
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mission of journalism and the journalistic norms that are espoused by 
those in the profession. 
Ho and Quinn contend that the wall between news and editorial 
content is crumbling and provide some correlations between the 
editorials and external measures of news bias as a point of 
validation.17 Unfortunately, these external measures, which are based 
on public evaluations of media slant in various outlets, do not make 
it clear what the public is thinking about (editorial news or straight 
news or some combination of both) when making these assessments. 
The authors use mondotimes.com user ratings of media organizations 
on a 1-5, liberal–conservative scale.18 The concern here is that it is 
impossible to determine whether individuals are basing their 
assessments on news content or editorial content or some mix of 
both. In other words, when an individual is asked to consider 
whether The Wall Street Journal is a liberal or conservative outlet, it 
is difficult to argue that their perception will ultimately 
compartmentalize the news and editorial sections of the publication. 
While the news aspect of the publication may be deemed liberal in 
tone by the respondent, the editorial aspect may be overwhelmingly 
conservative, and we are unable to properly ascertain what served as 
the basis for their response. The use of mondotimes.com ratings is 
not problematic in itself, as we use those ratings below. What is 
problematic is using them in conjunction with only editorial content 
to then conclude there is a news content bias, as opposed to an 
editorial slant or bias. Thus, while we concede that Ho and Quinn 
provide a very strong measure of editorial bias, it falls short of being 
a strong measure of news bias.19
Whether ideological news bias or slant exists, and to what 
extent, is a matter of primary interest for not only many in the 
scholarly community but many in the general public as well. Much 
of this fascination is generated by the supposed role of the free press 
in American political discourse. As the so-called fourth estate, the 
media takes on a watchdog function that should be critical of those in 
power, regardless of the target’s ideological persuasion. And yet, 
prior studies cast doubt on the ability of journalists to put their own 
ideological preferences aside, particularly when considering the 
17. See id. at 355.
18. See, e.g., id. at 369-70.
19. See id. at 372-73 (noting several limitations to the study).
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overwhelming number of liberal individuals in the profession.20 As 
Groseclose and Milyo note, the reportedly disproportionate number 
of self-identified liberals in the news media makes the “fourth estate”
the least representative of any found in the area of governance.21
Furthermore, political developments since the 2016 presidential 
election have cast an even greater shadow over the journalistic 
profession than usual. The Trump Administration’s affinity for the 
phrase “fake news”—frequently used to challenge negative reports 
of administration activities—has helped to drive down trust in the 
media and ramp up perceptions of media bias, particularly among 
self-identified Republicans.22 As Americans become more 
ideologically selective in their media consumption,23 the likelihood
of trusting information from ideologically incongruent sources 
plummets, and the disconnect between Americans on each end of the 
spectrum may spur greater incivility and polarization.24
Measuring news bias is in itself a difficult and controversial 
endeavor. Since the concept of “bias” is not an observable variable, 
researchers are forced to rely on the construction of latent variable 
constructs generated from other observable aspects of media 
coverage. This is, of course, a common issue in many aspects of the 
social sciences, particularly when attempting to measure individual 
attitudes. Mentioned earlier, the mondotimes.com score used by Ho 
and Quinn offers a simple example of a latent variable used to 
measure the presence of bias, in which respondents offered their own 
perceptions of bias in media outlets.25 While the respondent 
possesses a true attitude about any individual outlet’s slant (T), 
anything from mood to website design to random error (İ) may skew 
the measurement of T. Therefore, what the respondent provides as a 
score on the website may not, and likely will not, be T, but rather the 
true score influenced by İThe resulting observed score (X) collected 
20. See, e.g., ELAINE S. POVICH, PARTNERS & ADVERSARIES: THE 
CONTENTIOUS CONNECTION BETWEEN CONGRESS & THE MEDIA 140 (1996).
21. See generally Tim Groseclose & Jeffrey Milyo, A Measure of Media 
Bias, 120 Q.J. ECON. 1191 (2003).
22. See Michael Barthel & Amy Mitchell, Americans’ Attitudes About the 
News Media Deeply Divided Along Partisan Lines, PEW RES. CTR. (May 10, 2017),
http://www.journalism.org/2017/05/10/americans-attitudes-about-the-news-media-
deeply-divided-along-partisan-lines/ [https://perma.cc/QYK8-47QQ].
23. See generally Shanto Iyengar & Kyu S. Hahn, Red Media, Blue Media: 
Evidence of Ideological Selectivity in Media Use, 59 J. COMM. 19, 19 (2009). 
24. MATTHEW LEVENDUSKY, HOW PARTISAN MEDIA POLARIZE AMERICA 5
(2013).
25. See Ho & Quinn, supra note 12, at 369-70.
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is therefore not necessarily the true score but is believed to be 
heavily influenced by the true score with some potential variance 
remaining, as evinced by a simple equation:
; 7İ
None of this is to suggest that user ratings or public attitudes in 
any capacity are the most ideal way to measure news bias. Again, 
these are merely the perceptions of the individual, and as mentioned 
earlier, perceptions of media bias are highly susceptible to individual 
ideological preferences and are unlikely to be purely objective 
ratings.26 Therefore, the development of latent bias constructs—
whether from a single observed score or multiple items—leads to a 
great deal of creativity and controversy. For example, Ho and Quinn 
pit their findings against two other studies of media bias worthy of 
note.27 Peake focuses on the headline tone of front-page newspaper 
coverage of the Bush presidency, finding that tone is heavily 
influenced by the ideological position of the paper.28 Ideological 
position, in this instance, is based on whether or not the paper 
endorsed Bush in the election. Unfortunately, the measure of tone, 
again, does not rely on news content itself but rather a categorical 
decision made by the individual coder as to whether the headline is 
positive, negative, or neutral based on prior established coding 
standards. 
An alternative bias study from Groseclose and Milyo relies on 
an examination of think tank citations in congressional speeches, a 
proxy for the median American, against citations of these think tanks 
in news reporting.29 News outlets that reference ideological think 
tanks to a greater degree than the congressional average are 
considered to be expressing bias. Groseclose and Milyo rely on a 
single heuristic without paying attention to actual news content but 
claim their results are indicative of widespread liberal bias in media 
coverage.30 However, the reliance on think tank citations is perhaps 
doubly problematic because it essentially ignores major aspects of 
the content itself, and their inclusion in any reporting is not 
26. See Barthel & Mitchell, supra note 22.
27. See Ho & Quinn, supra note 12, at 356.
28. Jeffrey S. Peake, Presidents and Front-Page News: How America’s 
Newspapers Cover the Bush Administration, 12 HARV. NAT’L J. PRESS/POL. 52, 52 
(2007).
29. See Groseclose & Milyo, supra note 21, at 1191.
30. See id.
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necessarily an indicator of agreement but may in fact be included 
critically. 
While we admit that the development of a satisfactory 
measurement of bias is difficult, and we only scratch the surface in 
terms of bias studies, we believe there are two essential elements 
required of a measure of news bias in reporting. First, we believe that 
a measure of news bias should be based on news, not editorial 
content. It is yet to be clearly demonstrated that editorial bias is 
commensurate with news bias, and such a relationship should not be 
assumed. Second, we believe that a measure of news bias should be 
based on actual news content. While prior studies creatively find 
ways to assess bias through other means, we contend that it is the 
complete information provided in the news report itself that should 
be used to determine slant. Yet, given that, it is entirely possible that 
news coverage of Court decisions may not contain the same 
ideological slant or bias.
II. WHY MIGHT MEDIA CONTENT ABOUT THE COURT NOT BE 
IDEOLOGICALLY SLANTED?
There are a number of reasons to consider why Supreme Court 
content might be comparatively impervious to broad biases. First, 
despite all of the recent concern about “fake news,” mainstream 
outlets have journalistic norms that are comparable and likely 
sympathetic to the professional norms of the judiciary. The vast
majority of journalists, at least normatively, tend to be concerned 
with objective truth and public accountability—the “watchdog” 
function of journalism that is comparable to the counter-majoritarian 
status of the courts.31 Also, while many outlets have moved away 
from the practice of maintaining full-time Supreme Court reporters, 
those that are in these positions are often trained in law themselves. 
It is also worth noting that most major journalism programs in the 
United States require at least some basic coursework in First 
Amendment or communications law, not only for the purpose of 
investigative reporting, but for a better understanding of their 
constitutionally afforded protections.32 That is to say, many programs 
31. See BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM:
WHAT NEWSPEOPLE SHOULD KNOW AND THE PUBLIC SHOULD EXPECT 140-41 (2007). 
32. See generally Dianne Lynch, Above and Beyond: Looking at the Future 
of Journalism Education, KNIGHT FOUND., Feb. 19, 2015, 
https://knightfoundation.org/reports/above-and-beyond-looking-future-journalism-
educati [https://perma.cc/Q32Y-CNHM].
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feature an emphasis on the history of major legal decisions to 
familiarize future reporters of standing precedent regarding 
journalistic controversies. From Near v. Minnesota to Hustler 
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell and beyond, major journalism programs 
expect students to be able to identify the relevant case law that looms 
over their profession. 
Second, many argue that court reporting, and specifically 
Supreme Court reporting, is a rather formulaic exercise in which 
even the most seasoned Supreme Court reporters maintain a basic 
structure of reporting that rarely deviates from a step-by-step 
procedure.33 For example, one reporter said reporting is “almost a 
formula story: the Supreme Court upheld, struck down, did x, y, z. 
Then I try to give a sense of the vote and perhaps implications. . . . 
It’s not real hard to do. It’s almost like a science.”34 In another 
example, David Savage, someone who has covered the Court for 
several outlets, makes the case that how the Court is covered 
suggests a framework that helps resist outside influence. For 
example, in Davis’s edited volume, Savage provides a discussion of 
how traditional journalists cover the Supreme Court in a new media 
age. Savage writes, “The basics of writing about the Court have not 
changed. With each decision comes at least three questions: What
did the Court decide? What is the legal basis for the decision? What 
does it mean?”35 Building on that last quote, the remoteness of the 
institution creates a number of obstacles that simply are not found in 
other avenues of political reporting; thus, the reporter is often left 
with the task of simply figuring out what the Court actually decided. 
Like in any other journalistic mission, a certain level of “news 
judgment” is involved that may lead to ideological discussion, but to 
a far more limited degree. Finally, with the limited amount of 
resources dedicated to Supreme Court reporting,36 the mere lack of 
space to maneuver into more ideological discussion is an additional 
constraint. With the exception of some major newspapers, most 
33. Linda Greenhouse, Telling the Court’s Story: Justice and Journalism at 
the Supreme Court, 105 YALE L.J. 1537, 1543 (1996).
34. RICHARD DAVIS, DECISIONS AND IMAGES: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
PRESS 83 (1994).
35. DAVID G. SAVAGE, COVERING THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN 
THE DIGITAL AGE 176 (Richard Davis ed., 2014).
36. DAVIS, supra note 34, at 83; ELLIOT E. SLOTNICK & JENNIFER A. SEGAL,
TELEVISION NEWS AND THE SUPREME COURT: ALL THE NEWS THAT’S FIT TO AIR? 10 
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1998); Tyler Johnson, How and Why the Supreme Court 
Remains Undercovered, in COVERING THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN THE 
DIGITAL AGE 25 (Richard Davis ed., 2014).
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outlets do not consistently cover Court activity, and even when they 
do, the space limitations are considerable.37
There is a possibility that certain circumstances may elicit more 
ideological coverage. It should come as no surprise to even the most 
casual news consumer that a great deal of news content is based on 
sensationalistic events of high novelty. Again, in the case of the 
Court, it is difficult to suggest its activities commonly meet a 
definition of sensational, with the discussion over Scalia’s use of the 
term “jiggery pokery” in King v. Burwell standing as a recent high 
water mark.38 Alternatively, that third aspect of Savage’s to-do list, 
“what does it mean,” opens up some broader avenues for potential 
ideological content. It is at this point that a story may move from 
factual analysis to reaction—a point early scholarly research of 
Supreme Court coverage noted was a particularly fruitful way for 
journalists to inject some life into Supreme Court coverage.39
Clearly, not all cases are likely to warrant a consideration of 
reaction, just as most cases fail to receive any coverage whatsoever.40
Regarding this latter point, some research shows there may be a 
coverage bias in relation to civil rights and liberties cases,41
suggesting these issue areas attract greater attention from the media, 
but evidence of any content bias regarding these types of cases is 
lacking. Instead, it is far more likely that the introduction of 
ideological content in Supreme Court reporting comes in cases that 
are conflictual, controversial, or highly salient. For instance, Zilis 
finds that decisions with low levels of judicial consensus tend to 
elicit stories that focus in greater detail on dissents, amplifying what 
is often an ideological divide or conflict on the Court.42 It is possible 
that controversial and salient decisions follow a similar trend for a 
number of reasons. The Court is certainly not blind to the 
controversy and importance of some of their looming decisions, and 
content of sharply worded opinions is likely to find its way into news 
content.43 Additionally, controversial cases allow for the 
incorporation of more outside information in a story that may give 
disproportionate weight to one side of the case. Finally, and in a 
37. See Greenhouse, supra note 33, at 1550.
38. 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2500 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
39. See Newland, supra note 6, at 16.
40. See, e.g., SLOTNICK & SEGAL, supra note 36, at 11. 
41. See id. at 213.
42. See ZILIS, supra note 7, at 77-96.
43. See id. at 1-2.
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direction more consistent with the work of Groseclose and Milyo,44
there are opportunities to include those aforementioned reactions 
from politicians, think tanks, interested parties, and common 
citizens.
Of course, we do not suggest that all outlets treat their content 
in a similar way, or even that all authors of the same outlet do. At the 
same time, we also recognize that most prior bias measures are 
focusing on bias in all subjects, not just the Court. And while Ho and 
Quinn’s measure is explicitly formulated based on editorials, not 
news content, we acknowledge that certain outlets do have 
reputations for ideological content.45 In the era of “fake news,” 
liberal bias has been broadly assigned to most outlets critical of the 
current administration, but the belief in widespread liberal bias is 
nothing new. On the other side of the aisle, there are certain 
informational sources that are almost universally considered to 
promote a conservative agenda—again, perhaps most directly 
through editorial or opinion based content. However, we again argue 
that the Court may be largely resistant or possibly immune, even 
among those outlets perceived to be ideologically driven, to such 
bias in coverage of its day-to-day activities.
This leads to our proposed test. We propose that news content, 
which we take to be the substance and words of the news articles 
themselves, should show an ideological bias if there is a connection 
between the news content and external readers’ perceptions of their 
news slant. More specifically, we expect to see whether estimated 
measures of the ideological or partisan content correlate with known, 
external measures of media outlet ideology. This is essentially a 
similar test to the one proposed by Ho and Quinn,46 but we test it on 
news content and not the editorial positions of newspapers. 
Importantly, we perform this test initially on Supreme Court stories 
of all cases and issue areas for one Supreme Court term. We then 
explore this relationship further by isolating conditions for when we 
think the media would be more or less likely to cover the Court in an 
ideological or partisan fashion. Specifically, we think likely 
conditions for ideological coverage would be: 5-4 decisions and in 
civil rights and liberties cases. We chose those conditions because 
they have been known to generate a significant amount of attention 
in the past and reside where much of the controversy surrounding the 
44. See Groseclose & Milyo, supra note 21, at 1191.
45. See Ho & Quinn, supra note 12, at 355.
46. See id.
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Court seems to be. In contrast, most unanimous cases (9-0) do not 
generate widespread ideological or partisan concerns and should not 
encourage greater ideological or partisan coverage. We also test two 
other considerations, one stemming from a methodological 
consideration and the other from a journalistic consideration. 
Specifically, we examine the subset of stories that contain at least 
200 words or more with the expectation that longer stories are more 
likely to contain ideological or partisan information. We also 
examine the subset of stories that have had Associate Press (AP) 
duplicate stories removed. We note a common journalistic practice 
for outlets is to use a basic AP story rather than their own content, so 
we expect more ideological or partisan content when the outlets put 
forth their own original content. Given these tests, if we fail to 
observe a significant relationship between the two constructs of 
interest, then it suggests to us support for the argument that there 
may be something unique about the Court and its coverage that 
buoys the idea that there are potential conditions when Court 
coverage does not have a clear ideological slant. 
III. METHOD, MEASURES, AND DATA
To measure the ideological content in news stories covering 
Supreme Court decisions, we build our measure using the textual 
content of news stories. Specifically, we take a text-as-data 
approach47 and scale stories from a range of news outlets. In this 
Article, as a first step, we propose using only a dictionary-based 
method, though we will use two different dictionaries—one 
theorized to comprise partisan words and the other comprised of 
ideological words. 
Dictionary-based approaches are not conventionally 
conceptualized to be part of the scaling process. For example, 
Grimmer and Stewart do not even list dictionary methods as an 
option for scaling on their flowchart in providing an overview of 
text-as-data.48 However, it should be noted that a dictionary approach 
is easily adaptable for this purpose. 
Dictionary-based approaches have several benefits. First, the 
dictionaries are comprised of several words or phrases that the 
researcher knows, ex ante, to be theoretically related to the construct 
of interest. This is an advantage, at least initially, in that the 
47. See generally Grimmer & Stewart, supra note 3.
48. See id. at 268. 
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researcher begins the process with a degree of validation for what the 
text-search process will return when it goes and counts the number of 
times words are used. In contrast, a completely unsupervised 
estimation procedure of scaling with text does not bring any ex ante
information to the estimation process; thus, much effort has to be 
spent on the backend of the project validating whether the estimates 
are in fact what they were originally thought to be. The most 
common unsupervised method is the classic Wordfish approach, 
which is a text-scaling model based on relative word frequency that 
imposes no assumptions on the placement of words or documents in 
ideological space.49 Nothing is inherently wrong with taking an 
unsupervised approach, but rather each approach can be seen as part 
of a tradeoff.50
Second, the dictionary-based approach highlighted here does 
not require us to bring any a priori assumptions about the documents
themselves. Indeed, it is often the case that a supervised learning 
approach to scaling with text requires the researcher to assign a set of 
“reference” texts—predetermined places on the dimension that 
enable the “virgin” texts to be scored in relation to the reference 
texts.51 This is the classic Wordscores approach.52 In contrast, with a 
dictionary-based approach, the researcher gains the leverage of not 
having to place restrictive assumptions on certain documents because 
the researcher has instead made an assumption with respect to the 
words or phrases thought to represent the dimension of interest. The 
value of this tradeoff can be seen in that dictionary approaches: (1) 
do not lose the ability to make inferences about the small sample of 
reference documents in the analysis; and (2) the researcher is not 
forced to make an imprecise global judgment for the placement of a 
reference document, especially if one has not read all documents in 
the sample. In sum, a dictionary-based measurement approach has 
characteristics that make it similar to supervised learning approaches,
but by making a different set of assumptions, it provides a benefit 
that a classic supervised approach cannot. 
49. Jonathan B. Slapin & Sven-Oliver Proksch, A Scaling Model for 
Estimating Time-Series Party Positions from Texts, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 705, 708 
(2008).
50. See Kevin M. Quinn et al., How to Analyze Political Attention with 
Minimal Assumptions and Costs, AM. J. POL. SCI., 209-10 (2010) (discussing this
tradeoff in the context of topic models).
51. See Michael Lavar et al., Extracting Policy Positions from Political 
Texts Using Words as Data, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 313, 319 (2003).
52. See id.
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In contrast, of course, researchers are still imposing their own 
knowledge and biases in constructing the lists of words used in the 
dictionary. Thus, neither approach is necessarily better, and finding 
the appropriate method will ultimately depend on the goal(s) of the 
analysis. The goal of this Article is only to demonstrate the 
usefulness of dictionary-based approaches for measuring latent 
constructs in the legal world. The goal is not to argue that dictionary-
based measurement strategies are superior.53
Third, while dictionaries are often criticized as blunt, they are 
extremely powerful given the relative ease with which they are 
implemented and applied. Furthermore, despite criticisms for their 
use outside the context for which they were developed,54 dictionary-
based approaches tend to be robust.55 The concerns with dictionary-
based approaches being used out of context have arguably led to 
critics being hypersensitive to the fear that dictionaries will make an 
overabundance of false negatives and false positives. In other words, 
the concern is that dictionary-based approaches will miss instances 
of phenomena that the researcher cares about (e.g., generate false 
negatives) and also inadvertently capture instances of word usage 
that are not consistent with the underlying meaning of the construct 
(e.g., false positives).
With the two dictionaries we chose below, we can assess the 
“out-of-context” criticism directly because we are using two 
dictionaries that were developed for a different context (e.g., 
governors’ speeches and congressional speeches) and for a different 
time period (about ten years prior to the era we examine, the 2014 
Term). If we find a nontrivial number of significant relationships 
between our dictionary measures of ideological and partisan content 
53. To be sure, it is important to note how this dictionary-based approach is 
different from what Monroe, Colaresi, and Quinn discuss as feature selection, which 
examines a set of documents and selects words in a particular space. See generally
Burt L. Monroe, Michael P. Colaresi & Kevin M. Quinn, Fightin’ Words: Lexical 
Feature Selection and Evaluation for Identifying the Content of Political Conflict,
16 POL. ANALYSIS 372 (2008). What we are proposing here is trying to put 
documents in space by starting with some assumptions about a selection of words.
54. See Grimmer & Stewart, supra note 3, at 2.
55. For just one example, see the research on the dictionary-based program 
Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count [LIWC], which has been extended to many 
different domains and time periods. See James W. Pennebaker & Laura A. King, 
Linguistic Styles: Language Use as an Individual Difference, 77 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 1296, 1297-98 (2000); Yla R. Tausczik & James W. Pennebaker. 
The Psychological Meaning of Words: LIWC and Computerized Text Analysis 
Methods, 29 J. LANGUAGE & SOC. PSYCHOL. 24 (2010). 
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and the facially valid external measures of media bias, then that 
should lend support to the claim of dictionary methods having some 
robustness. In fact, it suggests the possibility that if we were to 
develop word dictionaries specifically for the topic of focus, then our 
results may be stronger.
To provide as broad of coverage as possible, we use two 
different dictionaries. First, we use the ideological dictionary 
developed by Coffey in his examination of governors’ ideology in 
State of the State addresses.56 The second dictionary is a partisan 
word dictionary.57 The list is comprised of the sixty most partisan 
two- and three-word phrases for both Democrats and Republicans 
from the 2005 Congress.58 We chose both a partisanship and 
ideology dictionary to assess both constructs, even though in 
contemporary terms both of those will have a large degree of 
overlap. We discuss each of these in turn.
For our ideological dictionary, we use Coffey’s list.59 Coffey 
constructed lists of words for both liberal and conservative 
dimensions.60 Specifically, he had lists of words for a redistributive 
dimension, a social dimension, and a government power dimension.61
While there were also subscales for each of those three main 
dimensions, we focus only on those; and to simplify matters, we 
simply combine all of the dimensions and search for all liberal and 
all conservative words. A full list of these words is available in the 
appendix. The program then counts the number of times each 
dictionary word is present, and we are left with two variables—
liberal words and conservative words. To construct an ideological 
dimension from those two variables, we use a simple ideological 
word polarization formula:
(liberal words – conservative words)/(liberal words + 
conservative words) 
= ideological word polarization
56. Daniel Coffey, Measuring Gubernatorial Ideology: A Content Analysis 
of State of the State Speeches, 5 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 88, 89 (2005).
57. Matthew Gentzkow & Jesse M. Shapiro, What Drives Media Slant? 
Evidence from U.S. Daily Newspapers (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 12707).
58. See id.
59. See Coffey, supra note 56, at 95. 
60. See id. at 91.
61. See id. at 95.
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For the partisan dictionary, we use the sixty most used partisan 
phrases for both Democrats and Republicans in 2005 Congressional 
speeches, as published in Gentkow and Shapiro’s Table 1.62 In 
general news stories, they found a relationship between outlet 
ideology and news content (recall, our focus is on stories about Court 
coverage).63 The words (or phrases) used for these dictionaries are in 
Appendix A. Similarly, after the program counted the words in each 
dictionary, we are left with two variables—one for Democrat words 
and one for Republican words. We use a simple party word 
polarization formula similar to our ideological formula:
(Democrat words – Republican words)/(Democrat words +
Republican words) 
= party word polarization
We perform our text analysis and construct the dictionaries 
with R using the quanteda package.64 Note: Both of the above 
polarization formulas standardize the word frequency by dividing by 
the total word counts of the total partisan and ideological words. We 
also try one other alternative way to standardize the word counts, and 
that is to transform each count by taking its log and using the above 
formulas.
For our external measure of ideology, we use a combination of 
two different measures. The first is the user ratings from 
mondotimes.com discussed earlier. They were previously used in 
both Ho and Quinn65 and Gentzkow and Shapiro.66 The second 
measure is from a second, similar user ratings site—AllSides.com.67
Both measures use a 5-point scale, and they correlate quite well 
(r=.82). Hence, we “split-the-difference” between the two and take 
the average of both measures. It results in a scale that ranges from 1 
to 5 (with increments every .5), where 1 is very liberal and 5 is very 
conservative. Some examples include Newsmax and Fox on the 
conservative end, the Daily Kos and the Daily Beast on the liberal 
62. See Gentzkow & Shapiro, supra note 57, at 44-45. 
63. See id. at 36.
64. See Kenneth Benoit & Kohei Watanabe, An R Package for the 
Quantitative Analysis of Textual Data, GITHUB, https://github.com/kbenoit/quanteda 
[https://perma.cc/B2RS-LZQ3] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018). 
65. See Ho & Quinn, supra note 12, at 369.
66. See Gentzkow & Shapiro, supra note 57, at 47.
67. See ALLSIDES, https://www.allsides.com/unbiased-balanced-
news [https://perma.cc/VZ4X-SKNY] (last visited Feb. 19, 2018).
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end, and CNN and USA Today in the middle with a rating of 3. The 
ratings for all of the outlets we use are listed here: 
1 = Beast, KOS, Huffington Post
1.5 = Salon, Boston Globe
2 = LA Times, Atlanta Journal Constitution, MSNBC, Washington Post, 
New York Times, ABC
2.5 = CBS, Reuters, AP, NPR, Chicago Sun Times, NBC
3 = CNN, Christian Science Monitor, Politico, USA
3.5 = Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune
4.5 = Washington Times
5 = Newsmax, FOX
For our measure of association, we rely on a simple yet 
straightforward measure of association, a pairwise correlation 
coefficient. For illustrative purposes, we also graph out each test, and 
some of these are shown below. Correlations are intuitive to use as a 
measure of association because of their ease of interpretation, with 
higher correlations bounded by 1 and -1, indicating a strong 
correlation, and correlations closer to zero representing a weak or 
nonexistent relationship. In terms of the direction of the correlation 
coefficient, given the formulas, where higher values represent more 
Democratic and liberal estimates, and given the external measures, 
where higher values represent more Republican and conservative 
estimates, we expect to see a negative correlation.
One weakness of relying on a correlation in this context is that 
it is sensitive to outliers when there are a small number of 
observations. In other words, because one or two observations can 
have disproportional influence, the correlation coefficient can be a 
conservative measure in terms of finding a significant relationship. 
Substantively, this means that there can be a significant relationship 
between the two constructs of interest, but that relationship may be 
drowned out by the measurement noise if one or two cases are 
outliers, giving a null reading.68
We utilize a dataset of more than 1,000 news articles on 
Supreme Court decisions in the 2014 term from twenty-six different 
68. We should also note that correlations do not factor in a measure of 
uncertainty surrounding each outlet’s point estimate. For example, an estimated 
location of an outlet may not fall on the imaginary diagonal that would create a 
perfect correlation between our measure and the external validated measure, but its 
confidence interval might.
Using Text as Data 1075
news organizations. Important for our conceptualization of bias, we 
focused on news articles alone, not opinion or editorial content, and 
we limited our stories to appearing within three days of the
announcement of the decision.
Admittedly, all of our stories, despite coming from sources that 
specialize in different media, come from online databases. We justify 
this decision based on the increasing trend toward online news 
consumption, and in the case of newspapers in our study, the content 
provided online and in print is most often identical. While we 
include most of the major outlets in American news (e.g., The New 
York Times, CNN, CBS News, etc.), our selected sources are 
geographically diverse as well, with sources from both coasts, the 
North, and the South respectively. Perhaps more importantly for the 
purposes of this Article, our sources span the perceived ideological 
spectrum, based on both the mondotimes.com scores and the second 
user-generated set of bias evaluations from AllSides.com.
To summarize our tests, we have two dictionaries (ideology 
and partisan), two weights for the words (frequency and log), and 
five different groupings for the stories (all stories, only stories with 
at least 200 words, removing AP duplicate stories, only stories 
covering 5-4 decisions, and only stories about civil rights and 
liberties decisions). We divided the stories into these different 
groupings because we expect them to influence the strength of the 
relationship between our estimate and the external indicator of outlet 
ideology. For example, we expect shorter stories to contain less 
partisan or ideological information simply because there is less 
information in shorter stories, and we expect outlets that use an AP 
wire story rather than produce their own content to contain less 
ideological or partisan information. Conversely, we expect that 5-4
decisions and civil rights and liberties cases will contain more 
ideological and partisan words. In total, we have twenty different 
possible correlations that will systematically test whether the news 
content covering Court decisions contains ideological or partisan 
content.
After the dictionaries are applied to the approximately 1075 
texts, we then collapse the matrix by outlet, taking the mean of each
outlet’s score. This mean outlet score is then correlated with the 
external measure. This process is repeated for each grouping of texts.
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IV. RESULTS
Table 1 contains the results from the twenty different 
correlation tests. Examining the column that contains correlations for 
all of the outlets (n=26), we see some interesting results. First, we 
see that the partisan dictionary achieved mild significance in almost 
all situations. To take one specific example, examine Model #2, 
which contains all stories and treats the words as frequencies: We see 
that the correlation is -.381 (p=.054). This suggests there is a mild 
degree of systematic partisan slant in the news stories covering 
Supreme Court decisions. To see what this looks like graphically, 
Figure 1 plots the correlation, with the x-axis being the external 
composite measure and the y-axis being the estimated dimension. It 
shows a mild negative relationship. Interestingly, some of the more 
liberal outlets (Huffington Post and The Boston Globe) and the more 
conservative outlets (The Washington Times and FOX) appear to be 
adding more noise to the correlation. Going further down Table 1 we 
see similar results for the section that uses only stories with at least 
200 words or more, the section with 5-4 decisions, and the section 
that removes AP duplicate stories. 
Table 1. Correlations of Dictionary-Based Estimates with 
External Measure of Ideology:








1 All Frequency Ideology -.082 -.467** (n=21)
2 All Frequency Partisan -.381* (p=.054)
-.569** 
(n=24)
3 All Log Ideology -.061 -.419*  (n=21)
4 All Log Partisan -.384* (p=.052)
-.572** 
(n=24)
5 docs with > 200 tokens Frequency Ideology -.098
-.399* 
(n=22)





7 docs with > 200 tokens Log Ideology -.072
-.376* 
(n=21)





9 Removes AP duplicates Frequency Ideology .068 ~
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11 Removes AP duplicates Log Ideology .060 ~





13 Only 5-4 decisions Frequency Ideology .257 ~





15 Only 5-4 decisions Log Ideology .194 ~





17 Only civil rights & lib. Frequency Ideology
.449** 
(p=.021) ~
18 Only civil rights & lib. Frequency Partisan -.129
-.456** 
(n=23)
19 Only civil rights & lib. Log Ideology
.511** 
(p=.008) ~
20 Only civil rights & lib. Log Partisan -.144
-.572** 
(n=22)
**=p<.05, *=p<.1. The correlation column (second from right) represents the 
pairwise correlation with the public based ideology rating for all outlets (n=26). The 
far-right column shows the pairwise correlation coefficient after removing quasi-
outlier observations (the column only shows a correlation if 5 or fewer observations 
could be removed to achieve a statistically significant correlation).
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Figure 1. Partisan Word Polarization:
Note: Estimates from Model 2 of Table 1 (All documents, frequency, Partisan 
Dictionary). The Y-axis represents the estimated dimension based on the texts. 
Correlation is -.381 (n=26).
If we return to the top of Table 1, Model 1, perhaps the biggest 
surprise is the ideology dictionary coefficient’s lack of magnitude 
and also lack of significance (r= -.082). We see this lack of 
significance in several other tests. In fact, the only place the ideology 
dictionary is significant is when it is in the wrong direction (Models 
#17 and #19), where we see that the ideology dictionary actually
contains a positive sign, and in the case of civil rights and liberties 
cases. This suggests that under these limited circumstances, readers 
are potentially getting a slant that is opposite of what they might 
expect. However, we think something else might explain the lack of 
findings with the ideological dictionary.
We were worried about correlations being influenced too much 
by a small number of observations, so we examined some of the 
plots. Figure 2 shows the plot of Model 1 in Table 1. At first glance,
there appears to be a potentially weak, negative correlation that is 
similar to the pattern found in Figure 1. However, if we look at the 
lower left corner of Figure 2, we see that there are some outlets that 
have a liberal reputation but were estimated to have more 
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Boston Globe, Salon, The New York Times, and the Chicago Sun 
Times all were estimated to have more conservative content. Given 
this finding, we wanted to further probe the sensitivity of the initial 
results by seeing whether we could find a significant correlational 
relationship by removing as few observations as possible. We did 
this by examining a plot of each of the twenty-six outlets and 
removing up to five observations that were the most inconsistent 
with their reputations, leaving at least twenty-one, or 80%, of the 
outlets.
Figure 2. Ideological Word Polarization:
Note: Estimates from Model 1 of Table 1 (All documents, frequency, Ideology 
Dictionary). The Y-axis represents the estimated dimension based on the texts. 
Correlation is -.082 (n=26). If 5 outlets are removed (HUFF, SALON, BGLOBE, 
NYT, and CST), then the correlation changes to -.467 (see Table 1).
To be clear, this is not a formal test. Rather, it is a practical and 
quick way to assess the robustness of the findings. It is designed to 
see how sensitive each of the correlation coefficients are and if we 
might reach a different conclusion if we were to look at a major 
subset of the outlets. To place a limit on this data mining exercise, 
we only show the correlations for those models that we removed five 
outlets or fewer. The results for this are shown in the far-right 












































1 2 3 4 5
External Ideology Measure (composite)
1080 Michigan State Law Review 2017
outlets (twenty-one outlets or more), we see that most tests give us a 
result that supports the finding that the news outlets contain some 
mild degree of slant across both partisan and ideological dictionaries. 
For example, we now see that Model 1 is significant, with the 
coefficient changing from -.082 to -.467 after removing just 5 
observations. We see similar movements across all dictionaries. 
Furthermore, to demonstrate how some relationships get even 
stronger, we only have to remove just a few observations. For 
example, Model 2 removes just two outlets and the correlation jumps 
from -.381 to -.569, which is a fairly strong relationship. These 
findings suggest that, while there are some outlets that appear to 
contain little or no ideological or partisan slant (or at least our 
estimate of their content is not consistent with their reputations), 
there are a large number of outlets that do contain partisan and 
ideological slant.
V. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
The purpose of the Article was to demonstrate a relatively easy 
method for measuring a latent construct using a dictionary-based 
method that would be of interest to scholars of the empirical legal 
studies movement and legal analytics. We argued that the dictionary 
method was easy to implement; the researcher just has to come up
with a list of words that represent the latent dimension. With it, our 
preliminary findings suggest that there is not always a clear 
connection between estimates of news content slant and external 
measures of media slant. To be sure, we obtained consistent results 
with the partisan dictionary but less so with the ideological 
dictionary. While we saw the partisan dictionary contained the most 
evidence of slant, the ideology dictionary seemed to be operating 
only on a larger subset of the outlets (80% of the outlets). These 
findings suggest that there is some credence to the claims that news 
content may be influenced by the happenings on the editorial board 
or that journalists are starting to use partisan content to construct 
their stories. This partly supports the arguments made in Ho and 
Quinn69 and Gentzkow and Shapiro.70 However, we would note that 
this relationship is far from clear and that, at least for one of our 
dictionaries, journalistic norms appear to play a role in constraining 
this relationship.
69. See Ho & Quinn, supra note 12, at 372. 
70. See Gentzkow & Shapiro, supra note 57, at 64. 
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This has clear implications for the rule of law. Specifically, it 
suggests that individuals who must rely on information about the 
Court from media will not always receive information of a partisan 
or ideological flavor, despite prior suggestions. To be sure, in some 
instances they may receive a story that contains a mild slant. 
However, it is important to keep in mind that even if individuals only 
go to their preferred partisan or ideological source, the information 
they get will not always have a corresponding slant in relation to 
Court coverage. This provides some hope for advocates of 
democracy, and more directly the rule of law, in a time of great 
polarization. 
In future iterations of this research, we see several avenues to 
explore further. We examined only one approach to estimating a 
latent dimension: a dictionary-based approach. To get a more 
complete answer to our substantive question, we could apply more 
classical approaches, such as an unsupervised learning approach with 
the Wordfish scaling program, or a supervised approach with the 
Wordscores scaling program. Going even further, one might 
incorporate Wordshoal,71 which uses the unsupervised Wordfish 
framework but also accounts for the group-based nature of texts (by 
either author or case). Incorporating these alternative approaches 
should allow us to examine whether our conclusion is contingent on 
the method for estimating the ideological dimension. 
Finally, we note that there is a distinction between content bias 
and coverage bias. In this Article, we are only trying to measure 
content bias, and we recognize the possibility that the more 
ideological bias may occur when an outlet chooses to cover some 
stories and not others. Perhaps one can model the selection 
mechanism to account for when an outlet chooses to cover a story 
that can be jointly modeled with a measure of news content. 
Regardless, we argue that examining the stories that did appear 
provides us with strong grounds for measuring the construct of 
partisan or ideological news content. This is something that can be 
used by both empirical legal scholars and those in the legal analytics 
field.
71. Benjamin E. Lauderdale & Alexander Herzog, Measuring Political 
Positions from Legislative Speech, 24 POL. ANALYSIS 374, 374-75 (2016).
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APPENDIX A
Ideology of Outlet
To construct the ideology of the outlet, we relied on taking the 
average of two external measures: Mondotimes.com and 
allsides.com. Both sites use a 5-point scale and they correlate quite 
well—.82. As a simple way to “split-the-difference” between the 
two, we take the average of the two measures for our external 
measure of media ideology. This results in the below scale (note: we 
also have stories from Scotusblog.com and the Dallas Morning 
News, but we lose those observations because they both do not have 
a score to construct the average):
1 = Beast, KOS, Huffington Post
1.5 = Salon, Boston Globe
2 = LA Times, Atlanta Journal Constitution, MSNBC, Washington Post, 
New York Times, ABC
2.5 = CBS, Reuters, AP, NPR, Chicago Sun Times, NBC
3 = CNN, Christian Science Monitor, Politico, USA
3.5 = Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune
4.5 = Washington Times
5 = Newsmax, FOX
Outlets not used because of no match with external valid indicator (Dallas 
Morning News, SCOTUSBlog.com) or too few stories (NY Post).
Coffey’s (2005) Ideological Dictionaries (note: * indicates a 
wildcard and will search for all possible endings)
Conservative words (all dimensions combined): drain, irresponsible, out-
of-control, out of control, rein-in, rein in, restrain*, runaway, spending, 
wasteful, balanced budget, cut spending, slash spending, unnecessary 
spending, cut, decrease, discourage, earn, incentives, lower, reduce, relief, 
slash, give back, tax, your money, attract*, contract*, roadblocks, friendly 
environment, enterprise zone, industry, compet*, entrepreneur*, private 
sector, right-to-work, right to work, individual*, responsibility, self-
sufficient, private initiative, welfare rolls, able-bodied, able bodied, 
doctor-patient, frivolous lawsuits, liability insurance, government 
ownership, death panel, individual mandate, apprehend, assault, predator, 
castration, crime, deter, felon, firm, illegal, imprison, incarcerate, gangs, 
juvenile, lawless, lock, murder, parole, penal, prison, prosecute, punish, 
racket, rape, secure, sentence, steal, stolen, terror, three-strikes, three 
strikes, tougher, victim, weapon, convict, criminal, execute, offender, 
unlawful, violent, violence, bear arms, behind bars, crack down, death 
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penalty, gun rights, lethal injection, no parole, no tolerance, organized 
crime, law enforcement, almighty, atheism, character, Christian, corrupt, 
courtesy, disrupt*, duty, faith, heritage, honor, Lord, loyalty, moment-of-
silence, moment of silence, moral, prayer, probity, tradition, religion, 
values, volunteer, wedlock, divorce, discipline, disciplinary, obscene, 
pornograph*, threat, parental notification, immoral, teen-pregnancy, 
illegal immigrant, quota, reverse discrimination, bloated, burden, 
bureaucracy, control, cripple, deregulation, excessive, hamper, inefficient, 
interfere, massive, regulate, red-tape, seize, stifle, regulatory reform, 
discour*, charter, account, flexibility, parochial, exam, performance, 
results, standards, strict, testing, vouch, merit pay, parental involvement, 
private schools, demand, video cameras, harvest, hunt, permits, fish, util*, 
private property, property rights;
Liberal words (all dimensions combined): earmarked, prudent, raid, 
underfunded, crucial, dangerous, necessary, rich, fair, wealth, equitable, 
workers, depend, fair growth, fair price, living wage, responsible growth, 
cycle, homeless, job-training, poor, poverty, health-care benefits, poor 
families, retirement benefits, single mom, single mother, working poor, 
access to healthcare, affordable, subsidize, CHIP, eligible, exploit, disable, 
guarantee, high-cost, insurance, necessity, enrollment, patient-rights, 
premiums, sue, uninsure, seniors, basic need, children’s health insurance 
plan, insurance companies, welfare benefits, prescription drug benefit, 
elderly, medicaid, cruel, decriminalize, forgive, harass, harassment, hate-
crimes, hate crimes, innocent, legalize, moratorium, non-violent, 
rehabilitate, child abuse, domestic abuse, domestic violence, drug 
counseling, overcrowded prisons, public defender, racial profiling, school 
violence, censorship, choice, choose, indoctrinate, privacy, repression, 
sex, unfair, union, civil unions, free speech, fundamental right, no place, 
personal choice, woman’s right, African-American, blacks, discriminat*, 
freedom-of-religion, freedom of religion, hate, Hispanic, homosexual, 
human rights, injustice, inter-racial, legacy, lesbian, native-americans, 
prejudice, respect, stereotype*, unequal, dehuman*, diversity, women, 
equal, intrud*, liberal, minorit*, equal protection, religious rights, 
cigarettes, gun shows, gun violence, gun control, waiting period, danger, 
dysfunct*, exorbitant, freewheeling, gaming, gouging, irrespon*, 
manipulat*, overdevelop*, price-fix*, price-gouging, reasonable, reckless, 
require, poison, unrestricted, untested, basic necessity, public good, smart 
growth, universal health care, urban sprawl, bonus, noble, rebuild, reward, 
tuition, union, fair funding, classroom, public servants, school loan, teach, 
brownfield, carbon, co2, congestion, conservation, conserve, cycl*, 
desertification, dioxide, eco-system, energy-saving, energy saving, fragile, 
green, husbanded, monoxide, nature, opencast, over-use, ozone, planet, 
population, preserve, protect, re-use, rivers, smog, solar, species, 
stewardship, stream, toxic, tree, unleaded, warming, water, waterway, 
chemical, chimney, clean, deplet*, ecolog*, emission, environment, litter, 
pollut*, re-cycl*, wildl*, endangered species, future generations, acid rain, 
open spaces, hazardous.
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Partisan Dictionary Taken from Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) 
Table 1:
Democrat phrases: private accounts, Rosa Parks, workers rights, trade 
agreement, President budget, poor people, American people, Republican 
party, Republican Leader, tax breaks, change the rules, Arctic refuge, 
trade deficit, minimum wage, cut funding, oil companies, budget deficit, 
American workers, credit card, Republican Senators, living in poverty, 
nuclear option, privatization plan, Senate Republicans, war in Iraq, 
wildlife refuge, fuel efficiency, middle class, card companies, national 
wildlife, veterans health care, corporation for public broadcasting, cut 
health care, congressional black caucus, civil rights movement, VA health 
care, additional tax cuts, cuts to child support, billion in tax cuts, pay for 
the tax cuts, drilling in the Arctic National, credit card companies, tax cuts 
for people, victims of gun violence, security trust fund, oil and gas 
companies, solvency of social security, social security trust, prescription 
drug bill, Voting Rights Act, privatize social security, caliber sniper rifles, 
war in Iraq and Afghanistan, American free trade, increase in the 
minimum wage, civil rights protections, central American free, system of 
checks and balances, credit card debt, middle class families;
Republican phrases: stem cell, personal accounts, retirement accounts, 
natural gas, Saddam Hussein, government spending, death tax, pass the 
bill, national forest, illegal aliens, private property, minority leader, class 
action, border security, urge support, war on terror, president announces, 
cell lines, embryonic stem, human life, cord blood, tax relief, Chief 
Justice, action lawsuits, illegal immigration, human embryos, economic 
growth, date the time, increase taxes, food program, embryonic stem cell, 
circuit court of appeals, tongass national forest, hate crime legislation, 
death tax repeal, pluripotent stem cells, stem cells, housing and urban 
affairs, Supreme court of Texas, oil for food program, million jobs 
created, Justice Priscilla Owen, energy and natural resources, oil for food 
scandal, American Bar Association, global war on terror, private property 
rights, growth and job creation, hate crimes law, temporary worker 
program, natural gas natural, change hearts and minds, class action reform, 
Grand Ole Opry, global war on terrorism, Chief Justice Rehnquist, reform 
social security.
